1. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS.
Movement of the command from the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON, FRANCE to the vicinity of GULPEN, HOLLAND, begun 2 February was successfully completed 0300 4 February.
From 4 February to 20 February training of reinforcements assault training by 7th AI Bn and specialized training with tank dozers by 18 Tk Bn readied the CC for battle operations.
On 21 Feb the CC moved to vicinity of SHILBERG where it went into Div reserve.
From 21 Feb to 26 Feb CCA remained in Div reserve. During this time arrangements were made for each medium tank company of the 18th Tk to fire indirect fire missions in sector held by CCB and this training was beneficially completed. The 7th AI Bn was detailed to CCR as a reserve on 25 Feb but was never committed.
On 27 - 28 Feb CCA moving via SITTARD - GEILENKIRCHEN - HILFARTH crossed the ROER river at HUCKELHOVEN, operated successfully against enemy at MERBECK abd TETELRATH.
2. COMBAT EFFICIENCY.
At the end of the period the combat efficiency of the combat command was excellent. Having been in one battle the troops were sure of themselves. Morale was high due to this and to rest under favorable circumstances in the vicinity of GULPIN, HOLLAND. Vehicle were in good condition. Reinforcements received, though not technically trained, were willing and eager to learn.
3. COMMENTS ON EMPLOYMENT OF UNIT, ETC.
During February the combat command was in general correctly employed by higher headquarters.
Orders for movement given on too short notice when the CC moved from the vicinity of SHILBERG caused some confusion in the operation. Iy is recommended that all normal attachments be left premanently attached to the CC for the dual purpose of having the CC ready to move on short notice and of conducting combined training with all units of the CC.
During operation E of the ROER R 27 & 28th of Feb the CC was assigned only one road squeezed in between two infantry divisions and used by one of the infantry divisions.This road was inadequate and the chance to maneuver was lost. Most of the time the striking force of the CC amounted to one platoon of tanks with a company of infantry, the remainder of the command being streached out on the road where it could not be employed. Armor when moving through or advancing in conjunction with infantry should be given adequate roads and road priorities.
S/Thomas V. Brooke THOMAS V. BROOKE Lt Col, Cavalry Executive Officer
