HEADQUARTERS CCA
8th Armd Div
APO 258, U. S. Army

AFTER ACTION REPORT
February 45

1. RESULTS OF OPERATIONS.

Movement of the command from the vicinity of PONT-A-MOUSSON, FRANCE to the vicinity of GULPEN, HOLLAND, begun 2 February was successfully completed 0300 4 February.

From 4 February to 20 February training of reinforcements assault training by 7th AI Bn and specialized training with tank dozers by 18 Tk Bn readied the CC for battle operations.

On 21 Feb the CC moved to vicinity of SHILBERG where it went into Div reserve.

From 21 Feb to 26 Feb CCA remained in Div reserve. During this time arrangements were made for each medium tank company of the 18th Tk to fire indirect fire missions in sector held by CCB and this training was beneficially completed. The 7th AI Bn was detailed to CCR as a reserve on 25 Feb but was never committed.

On 27 - 28 Feb CCA moving via SITTARD - GEILENKIRCHEN - HILFARTH crossed the ROER river at HUCKELHOVEN, operated successfully against enemy at MERBECK abd TETELRATH.

2. COMBAT EFFICIENCY.

At the end of the period the combat efficiency of the combat command was excellent. Having been in one battle the troops were sure of themselves. Morale was high due to this and to rest under favorable circumstances in the vicinity of GULPIN, HOLLAND. Vehicle were in good condition. Reinforcements received, though not technically trained, were willing and eager to learn.

3. COMMENTS ON EMPLOYMENT OF UNIT, ETC.

During February the combat command was in general correctly employed by higher headquarters.

Orders for movement given on too short notice when the CC moved from the vicinity of SHILBERG caused some confusion in the operation. Iy is recommended that all normal attachments be left premanently attached to the CC for the dual purpose of having the CC ready to move on short notice and of conducting combined training with all units of the CC.

During operation E of the ROER R 27 & 28th of Feb the CC was assigned only one road squeezed in between two infantry divisions and used by one of the infantry divisions.This road was inadequate and the chance to maneuver was lost. Most of the time the striking force of the CC amounted to one platoon of tanks with a company of infantry, the remainder of the command being streached out on the road where it could not be employed. Armor when moving through or advancing in conjunction with infantry should be given adequate roads and road priorities.

S/Thomas V. Brooke
THOMAS V. BROOKE
Lt Col, Cavalry
Executive Officer

HEADQUARTERS CCA
8th Armd Div
APO 258, U. S. Army

S-3 Report
1 February 45 to 28 February 45

4. Operations for the Period:

Combat Command "A" located vic PONT-A-MOUSSON, FRANCE, ordered to move to vic MAASTRICH, HOLLAND per Operational Instructions, Hq 8th AD of 2 Feb 45 with the following troops: Hq & Hq Co CC A, 7 AI Bn, 18 Tk Bn 398 AFA Bn, D Btry 467 AAA AW Bn (SP) and a Det of 78 Med Bn Armd.
    The combat command successfully completed long march, closed in new locations by 040300 Feb 45. D Btry 467 AAA AW Bn (SP) detached to 1st Army en route, at LIEGE, BELGIUM. Det 78 Med Bn reverted to Bn control upon closing in new location. Hq CC A located vic GULPEN; 7 aIBn vic CARTHILS; 18 Tk Bn vic BOCHOLTZ; 398 AFA Bn vic SIMPLEVELD.
    Remainder of period 4 to 20 Feb 45 was spent preparing for possible future action in various zones. Units conducted road rcn, terrain studies and personal contacts with adjacent troops. 398 AFA Bn under control of CO Div Arty effective 071300. B Btry 473 AAA Bn (SP) atchd 091030. A Co 809 TD Bn atchd 101500 Feb 45.
    Received Operational Instructions, Hq 8th AD 20 Feb 45, ordering CC to move to vic ECHT with following attachments: Hq & Hq Co CC A, 7 AIBn, 18 Tk Bn, A Co 809 TD Bn, B Btry 473 AAA AW Bn (SP), Co A 53 Engr Bn, Det A Co 130 Ord Maint Bn.
    The combat command moved to vic SCHILBERG on the 21st of February. Engr Co and Det of Ord Maint Bn reverted to respective Bn control upon closing in new areas.
    During this period units again made personal route and terrain rcn, anticipating action on various active fronts. The 7 AIBn was detached to CC R approx. 251430 as reserve for Combat Command R in the line. Co B 18 Tk Bn joined CC B to fire CC B missions on 25 Feb 45. After completing fire missions returned to initial location. Co A 18 Tk Bn joined CC D to fire CC B missions, returned to original position after completion.

27 Feb 45

Combat Command alerted to move per verbal instructions CG 8 AD with following troops: Hq & Hq Co CC A, 7 AIBn, 18 Tk Bn, 398 AFA Bn, A Co 53 Engr Bn, A Co 78 Med Bn, A Co 809 TD Bn, B Btry 473 AAA AW Bn (SO), A Tr 88 Cav Rcn Sq (Mecz). Column moved out on verbal orders CG 8 AD, reaching IP SUSTEREN approx 1400, to move vic SITTARD-GEILENKIRCHEN-HILFARTH to assembly area vic HUCKELHOVEN, Germany. On route CG VV A stopped at XVI Corps Hq SITTARD, and received further instructions verbally from CG XVI Corps. These instructions stated that CC A would not close into assembly area, but would continue to march to vic WEGBERG thru zone of 35 Inf Div. Poor road conditions and excessive traffic on the one road to pontoon bridge across the ROER R at HILFARTH over which the CG moved, hampered and delayed movement of the entire combat command.
    Leading elements crossed the ROER R approx. 1600. On route the command was reformed into two task forces and an Adv Gd under command of Lt. Col Crittendon. A Tr 88 Cav Rcn Sq reconnoitered routs of advance. The Adv Gd moved out from HUCKLEHOVEN and again movement was slow due to poor condition of roads and traffic congestion.
    At 0300 the head of the column halted outside of WEGBERG while the Ebgrs cleared the road block on the outskirts of the city. Clm was again halted at 0520 about one kilometer S of MERBECK, by another road block covered by small arms fire from MERBECK. Tanks were moved forward into the fields to the W of road and enemy MG positions were destroyed by direct fire.

28 Feb 45

Verbal instructions delivered by Ln O to Adv CP, WEGBERG, stated that march to the N would be pushed vigorously. The Adv Gd moved on to MERBECK. FWD elements were engaged in small arms fire fight. The Arty Btry atched to Adv Gd, moved into position rapidly and neutralized the enemy fire. The Inf move in, MERBECK was taken with slight opposition at 0820. An AT ditch was located on the road leading NW toward TETELRATH. This ditch and the road block were vigorously defended by small arms fire. The road in vicinity of the AT ditch was heavily mined, the mines being set into the hard surfaced road. Plans were drawn up by the Adv Gd commander to attack TETELRATH and remove the road block. Tanks were moved into direct fire positions to spt the dismounted infantry attack. Engrs moved forward and under fire cleared mines planted at the block at AT ditch. At this time CG CC a ordered the remainder of Atry Bn forward to firing positions in direct spt of the Adv Gd. During the early stages of the attack against TETELRATH heavy enemy mortar fire and some atry was fired into MERBECK. The objective ws mopped up by 1620, consolidated against counter-attack and the Adv Gd Comdr contacted CG CC A in regard to possible routes to continue the advance to the N. During the days operations approx. 125 PWs taken, 2 tanks lost to enemy mines, one of which was destroyed by fire, the other recovered. 30 casualties were suffered by the infantry elements of the combat command. At midnight, the close of the period, Rcn and Engr elements were moving forward reconnoitering the road north of TETELRATH. Mined roadway, one destroyed bridge, about 100 yards of abatis and a blown roadway at an AT ditch were located within the first few miles. There were no other routs available. Action was under way to clear these obstacles as rapidly as possible, Enemy patrols were encountered at the road blocks.

S/John R. Sheridan
John R. Sheridan
Major, Infantry
S-3