After Action Reports and Interviews
36th Tank Bn. - Hq Co - Werl/Blankenberg
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INTERVIEW

Unit: Hq 36th Tank Battalion (Task Force Van Houten), CCB.
Source: Lt Col John H. Van Houten, Commanding Officer.
Interviewer: Capt Joseph Vasta.
Place and Date of Interview: 5 May 45, Hasselfelde, Germany.
Comments: This battalion commander was prone to overstate his activities and gloss over the bad spots.

On the night of 4 April, Task Force Van Houten was given the mission to set up a defense in Dedinghausen (460415) and constitute a mobile reserve to be committed in case the enemy tried to break out of the Ruhr pocket. The routes of approach had all been planned.

Orders were received at 1000 hours 5 April to move out and pass thru and relieve Task Force Walker in the vicinity of Schmerlecke. This relief was effected at 1300 hours and a coordinated (within own task force) attack against Schallen was made. The task force continued on that evening to take Lohne. The enemy resistance was moderate generally, and heavy at times. The enemy was using anti-aircraft guns as artillery and also for ground defenses.

For the attack on Schallen, C Company got into support firing position from the northeast of the town. A Company took the left flank position and the assault guns and mortars went to the southeast of the town. These were A and C Companies of the 36th Tank Battalion. Company C of the 49th Armd Inf Battalion with one platoon of tanks from A Company 36th Tk Bn moved in by the covered route. The attack was launched at 1500 hours.

At the town of Lohne, C Company of the 36th Tk Bn formed the based of fire with the assault guns and mortars. The infantry, C Co of the 49th AIB, went into the town. As soon as the infantry got into the town, the tanks followed right in, a platoon at a time. The attack was at 1730 and the town was cleared by 2000.

Air support had been requested, but could not be used because the 95th Inf Division claimed that they were too close to Lohne at the time.

At 1000 hours 6 April Orders were received to take the town of Bad Sassendorf. The town was taken in a coordinated attack with Company C 36th Tk Bn and Company C 49th AIB. The town was posted for defense at 1230 hours. At that time, General Devine came down and ordered TF V to pull back, make a wide end run, come down and go along the edge of the lake and then cut up to Objective A. Objective A was about two kilometers west of Soest. (It was Ost Onnen).

TFV passed through TF Goodrich at Ellingsen and took the town of Echtrop with a reconnaissance platoon and a platoon of light tanks at 1430 hours. They chased out a tank, an armored car, a halftrack and a motorcycle and took 50 prisoners and encountered very light resistance. All along the route we took prisoners and come across scattered small arms fire. We caught a couple of medical convoys (four trucks) moving out of Soest and captured four anti-tank guns, ten ammunition trucks, four ammunition halftrack and a railroad train with ammunition. We got four tanks, one with the ammunition train.

A platoon of Company A 36th Tk Bn in position (see overlay) caught three tanks as they were coming out to get at our thin skinned vehicles. Two more halftracks were captured and also some civilian cars with German officers in them who tried to get away. (This operation was in the enemy rear and was disrupting their communications). We arrived at Ostonnen at 2000 hours and then the town was cleared by 2030 hours. At total of approximately 500 prisoners were taken that day of which about 350 came out of Ostonnen.

On April 7th we sat around until 1400 hours waiting for our other units to come abreast. We received orders at 1430 from the combat commander to take Mawicke and West Onnen and establish a base of fire from the vicinity of West Onnen while TF Roseborough attacked Werl from the southeast. S-2 Capt. William Hensel went into Mawicke with the burgomeister from Ost Onnen and asked the bugomeister to surrender. He surrendered by 1500 hours. In West Onnen artillery was received and was believed to be coming from Werl. However, we were in the town by 1600 hours and remained there for the rest of the day.

On April 8th Major John Pasco (S-3) went up to see the combat commander to take over the mission of taking Werl. Permission was granted and TFV moved out at 1400 hours. The first town taken was Ostufflen in the area of departure for the assault on Werl. There was heavy arty and mortar fire coming into this area. The reconnaissance platoon took the town and town was in our hands by 1600.

In the attack on Werl, Company A 36th Tk Bn was the base of fire from positions in the vicinity of about two kilometers east of Werl astride the east-west highway, Soest - Werl. The assault guns and mortars were the base of fire from the vicinicy of Ostufflen. The artillery gave support fire and also placed an artillery preparation.

C Company 49th Armd Inf Bn with C Company 36th Tk Bn assaulted and took the town. The infantry went into the town dismounted and closely followed by the tanks. During this time they were drawing heavy artillery and mortar fire which gradually became worse. The city was strongly defended by strong points consisting of machine gun emplacement and automatic fire. The infantry platoon, supported by tanks, had to mop up each point.

D Company 36th Tk Bn and B Company 49th AIB came in to assist in the cleaning out of this town. B Co 49th AIB was atchd for this operation and as it developed later, also in taking the next town. The town of Werl was completely cleared by 1930 hours.

At this time (1930 hours), we received orders to take the towns of Ost Buderich and West Buderich. The opposition was light to moderate. The mortar platoon was in the western edge of Werl to support the attack. We received some artillery before the attack started and mortar fire when we got into the towns. The towns were taken by 2100 hours.

About 2130 hours we received orders from the combat command by radio that TFV and TFR would take the next large town 16 kilometers to the west (the town of Unna). The details were to be worked out between Colonels Van Houten and Roseborough. The task forces were to leave at 0545 hours 9 April.

The orders were that that the reconnaissance should pass thru TF Van Houten and reconnoiter the resistance in front. The reconnaissance was delayed and about 0615 hours, General Devine came up and ordered TFV to move ahead without the benefit of reconnaissance in front. They continued on until they ran into tank fire at Hemmerde where the lead tank was knocked out either by anti-tank guns or an enemy tank. It was a foggy morning. It was decided to clear this town before going any further despite orders to bypass all resistance. The town couldn't be bypassed because this was the only available route through.

C Companies of the 36th Tk and 49th AIB teamed up to attack the town. An artillery preparation of approximately three to five minutes was placed on the town. The infantry went in dismounted, followed by the tanks. The enemy resistance was moderate but the enemy artillery was heavy. About 1200 hours, the town was cleared.

They reorganized and at 1430 hours, Company A 36th Tk and Company C 49th AIB moved forward, with the assault guns and mortars in position, to take West Hemmerde. The tank destroyers were protecting the left flank. They met light resistance and continued on to Stockum. Both of these towns were cleaned up by 1800 hours, and we remained there for the night.

On the 10th of April, A Company 36th Tank Bn was protecting the left (south) flank of TF Roseborough and supported the attack on Unna with fire (together with the assault guns). About 1700 hours we received orders to take Ostburen and Kesselburen. The first town of Ostburen offered no resistance. Going up the hill to the west of this town, Col. Van Houten ran into 40 enemy troops in a house. Between the driver, the Forward Observer and the Colonel, the 40 were rounded up and taken prisoner. The attack was launched from the high ground west of Ostburen. The intermediate point of the attack on Kesselburen was Korten. It was a coordinated attack by C Companies of the 36th Tk Bn and 49th AIB with the assault guns and mortars furnishing supporting fires and smoking both flanks. A Co. 36th Tk Bn supported by fire also. Smoke was used because the flanks were exposed to both sides of the woods.

Kesseburen was cleaned out by 2100 hours and we were ordered to hold up there for the night as CCA was to pass through to attack Unna.

On 11 April we were relieved.

Blankenburg

On the night of 19 April, we received a mission to try a dry run on Blankenburg. At 1000 hours the next morning (20 April) we went in on a bluff. Company A 36th Tk Bn went into firing position and actually fired five rounds per guns. C Company 36th Tk Bn was in position to assist and no infantry was to be used. At 1030 hours there was an air strike on the town.

At about 1530 hours, Col. Burba sent B Company 49th AIB to TF Van Housten and said that he wanted the task force to move into Blankenburg, take it and clean out the southern half of the town. Task Force Roseborough was to move into the northern half and clean out that part.

TF Van Houten attacked at 1720 hours with two tank companies abreast and the infantry company moving in the second wave. As soon as the outskirts of the town was reached, the infantry moved in. C Company 36th Tk Bn attacked and dominated the high ground just north of the town. The southern half of the town was cleaned out by 1930 hours but TF Roseborough hadn't entered yet - to the best knowledge of TF Van Houten.
The fighting in the town was very light and the tank force suffered no casualties. They took 700 prisoners and two large wagon trains of 300 horses and remained in Blankenburg for the night.

On the 21st of April our mission was to move and contact elements of the First U.S. Army and to accomplish this, the mission had to take the town of Cattenstedt. Task Force Moore (Executive Officer 36th Tk Bn) was formed and composed of the reconnaissance platoon, C Company 36th Tk and C Company 49th AIB.

Task Force Moore moved out at 0700 hours and secured its objective by 0730 hours, the resistance being very light. Contact was established with the 2nd Bn, 18th Infantry Regt, 1st Infantry Division in Weinrode at 0830 hours.

We remained in Weinrode pending further instructions as to governing certain areas in the Harz mountains.

JOHN H VAN HOUTEN
Lt. Col.,
Commanding Officer
36th Tank Battalion.